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spread of Islamic hegemony across
not just the land but also the sea.
In a world where information has not
always been easy to come by, Konstam’s
small but highly esteemed book does
justice to the world of competing
Arab-Byzantine interests. It covers the
specifics of the fierce at-sea dueling that
went on within the larger competition
that spread over a sea claimed by both
Byzantine Greek and Arab powers,
anticipating by half a millennium the
Ottoman conflict that would include
both the fall of Constantinople and
the ensuing battle of Lepanto.
PATRICK HUNT

Mayday: The Decline of American Naval Supremacy, by Seth Cropsey. New York: Overlook, 2014.
348 pages. $29.95 (paperback $17.95).

Mayday is an extended argument for
the expansion of the U.S. naval fleet to
confront Chinese ambitions in the South
China Sea, secure U.S. global interests,
and ensure America’s future as a great
power. The author, Mr. Seth Cropsey,
has considerable experience in defense
and government, having served as a
Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy in
two administrations, in addition to other
roles; he is associated with various think
tanks. He demonstrates an in-depth and
well-developed understanding of the
strategic issues the Navy faces as he
traces the development of U.S. sea power,
assesses its current state, and examines a
number of proposals before offering his
own prescription for the Navy’s future.
In many ways this book is a reapplication of pre–World War I naval theory
espoused by the Naval War College’s
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own Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. The
author uses Mahanian thought extensively in his analysis of the historical
development of American sea power
into its current incarnation, explaining
that, because of the U.S. Navy’s current
build rates and mismatched strategies,
it is on a downward trajectory that
will result in the loss of U.S. sea power.
This, in turn, will result in a loss of U.S.
influence and global stability worldwide.
This channeling of Mahan is generally
well executed, with one exception: at
several points within the text, Mahan’s
equation of naval strength with the
size of the national shipping fleet is
referenced, without a solid explanation of how that relates to the current
U.S. reliance on foreign carriers. The
proposed repeal of the Jones Act (which
mandates the use of U.S.-produced,
-flagged, and -crewed carriers for cargo
moved between U.S. ports) appears
almost out of nowhere, and while
a repeal definitely would improve
competition and lower shipping costs,
Mr. Cropsey fails to explain how this
would be beneficial to the Navy or assist
in correcting the strategic issues it faces.
The chapters on China’s naval expansion
and the ongoing gap between the U.S.
Navy’s force requirements and the
number of hulls that its shipbuilding
plan and budget can deliver are very
informative and well reasoned. When
observed through the Mahanian lens
that Mr. Cropsey provides, it is not
difficult to see how the People’s Liberation Army Navy has embraced the idea
that naval power is key to China’s ability
to influence the region and secure its
interests from the African littorals
to the deep waters of the Pacific.
The book runs a bit thin in the delivery
of economic arguments regarding
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the American deficit, national debt,
and entitlements, and the occasional
departures into partisan rhetoric do
not really serve the overall thrust of the
book. Some of the arguments it contains
are inconsistent or undeveloped. An example is the suggestion to build smaller,
single-mission hulls, which is followed
later by a diametrically opposite
recommendation to build multimission
frigates with antiair, antisubmarine,
and antisurface warfare capabilities.
Additionally, his proposal to relegate
much of the Army to National Guard
or Reserve status is probably politically
infeasible because of the dire effects this
would have on the communities around
major Army bases. All that aside, it is
difficult to disagree with the fundamental tenets of Mayday—that a sufficiently
sized and equipped Navy is crucial
for our continued national security
and the maintenance of international
order—and on these bases his arguments
for a naval expansion are sound.
Mayday provides an excellent case for
reversing the piecemeal downsizing of
the Navy, a return to pragmatic platform
design, and consistent funding of a
shipbuilding program to deliver and
maintain a fleet sized to secure our
interests and achieve our international
objectives. Although the quote is not
mentioned specifically, this book recalls
President George Washington’s observation in his letter of 15 November 1781
to the Marquis de Lafayette: “[W]ithout
a decisive naval force we can do nothing
definitive, and with it, everything
honorable and glorious.” Mr. Cropsey’s
recommendations are pragmatic and
worth consideration by senior Navy
leadership and policy makers alike.
JOSH HEIVLY
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Realpolitik: A History, by John Bew. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 408 pages. $27.95.

John Bew, a historian at King’s
College London, provides the first
comprehensive intellectual history of the
often-misunderstood term Realpolitik.
Drawing on the experience gained
from his acclaimed biography of Lord
Castlereagh, the Napoleonic-era British
foreign secretary, Bew traces Realpolitik
from its obscure, nineteenth-century
origins in revolutionary Germany to the
term’s use and misuse in contemporary
Anglo-American foreign policy debates.
Scholars and practitioners seeking to
gain a more nuanced understanding of
the evolution of Western foreign policy
thinking over the last century, particularly before 1945, would be well advised
to consider Bew’s compelling narrative.
In the often-glib foreign policy
discussions that characterize public
understanding of the discipline’s key
terms and points of contention, realism
is often supposed to be interchangeable with Realpolitik. Bew’s greatest
contribution is his voluminous research
into the term’s early history, beginning
with the 1853 book Foundations of
Realpolitik by the little-known German
philosopher Ludwig von Rochau. This
original formulation, distinct from
later uses in both Germany and the
Anglosphere, was a creature of its time
and place: a disunited Germany torn
between the liberal impulses of the
1848 revolutions and the conservatism
of its traditional ruling class, as
personified by Otto von Bismarck.
Rochau’s Realpolitik was not an ideology at all; it was a lens for viewing the
political circumstances of Germany’s
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